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LAW, DISSONANCE, AND REMOTE COMPUTER SEARCHES
Susan W. Brenner*
This Article examines the conflict-the dissonance-that arises
when law enforcement officers from one jurisdiction remotely
search a computer that is physically located in another
jurisdiction. It reviews the current status of remote computer
searches in Europe, noting that such searches are legal under
United Kingdom law but are, for most purposes, outlawed by
German law. The Article then explains that, because U.S. state
supreme courts have used their constitutions to impose search and
seizure requirements that exceed those of the Fourth Amendment,
similar dissonance has arisen between U.S. states. It uses this
domestic dissonance to analyze the issues transnational searches
are likely to create and to consider how those issues might be
resolved.
I. INTRODUCTION
As authorities in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere have
recognized for well over a decade,' cyberspace alters the process of
law enforcement's searching for evidence of criminal activity in a
very fundamental way: Crime ceases to be territorial as borders
become irrelevant, which is advantageous for law-breakers and
disadvantageous for law enforcers.2
* NCR Distinguished Professor of Law & Technology, University of Dayton
School of Law, Dayton, Ohio USA.
' See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME (ETS No.. 185) 131-37 (2001), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/itml/185.htm; HOLLIS STAMBAUGH
ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAw ENFORCEMENT NEEDS
To COMBAT ELECTRONIC CRIME 3-4 (2000).
2 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 1, at J 131-34; see also Susan W.
Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U.
J. SCi. & TECH. L. 1, 31-65 (2004).
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A case from Kentucky illustrates this. In 2009, cybercriminals
operating from outside the United States surreptitiously extracted
$415,989 from an account at the First Federal Savings Bank in
Shepherdsville, Kentucky.' The account belonged to Bullitt
County and held funds the county used to pay its employees.
On June 22, 2009, "someone started making unauthorized wire
transfers of $10,000 or less from the county's payroll to
accounts .. . around the country."' It was not until June 29 that
bank employees "realized something was wrong," but by that time
the money was gone.6 Because no one in Bullitt County had any
idea who was responsible for the transfers, county officials
contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which began
investigating.'
The investigation showed the transfers originated in Ukraine.'
The criminals used a Trojan Horse program "known as 'Zeus' " to
harvest the county's funds.' They "somehow" installed the
program on the county treasurer's computer.o Zeus "creates a
direct connection" between the infected computer (the treasurer's
computer) and the system used by the cybercriminals; this let them
"log in to the victim's bank account using the victim's own
[computer and] Internet connection . . . .""
3 The account of the crime is taken from the following sources: $415,989
Taken from Bullitt Bank Account, COURIER-JOURNAL, July 1, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 15630449; Kelly House, $415,989 Taken from Bullitt Bank
Account, COURIER-JOURNAL, July 2, 2009, at Al, available at 2009 WLNR
15629810; Brian Krebs, PC Invader Costs Ky. County $415,000, WASH. POST
(July 2, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/07/an-odysse
y of fraudpart ii.html.
4 See, e.g., Theft Used Stealthy Computer Code, COURIER-JOURNAL, July 27,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 15691911.
5 Krebs, supra note 3.
6 id
7 See, e.g., Hackers Stole $415,000from Bullitt County Coffers, SPAMFIGHTER
(July 21, 2009), http://www.spamfighter.com/News-12758-Hackers-Stole-$4150
00-from-Bullitt-County-Coffers.htm.
8 See, e.g., Krebs, supra note 3.
9 Id.
10 Id.
" Id.
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The cyberthieves then used the Zeus Trojan to acquire the
county treasurer's username and password and link her computer
with the one they would use in the thefts.12 Then they "logged into
the county's bank account by tunneling through the treasurer's
Internet connection."13  Since they were using her Internet
connection, the bank's system did not flag this as a problematic
attempt to log into the account.14 The thieves "created several
fictitious employees of the county" and initiated "a batch of wire
transfers" to them, extracting more than $400,000 from the
county's account." The cybercriminals arranged for U.S.-based
intermediaries to wire most of the funds to accounts in Ukraine, at
which point they disappeared.'" The criminals who created and
implemented the theft have not been, and most certainly will not
be, apprehended and punished for their crimes."
Unlike their traditional counterparts, cybercriminals can almost
instantaneously extract funds from a bank in one country and
deposit them into accounts in other countries before the bank
realizes what has happened." This vastly complicates law
enforcement's task of finding the perpetrator and bringing him or
her to justice. 9 The criminal's use of cyberspace effectively
fractures the crime, which means relevant evidence is located
12 See id. Kennan Bradley, the County Treasurer, later became one of the
plaintiffs in a lawsuit the County filed against the bank. See, e.g., Emily
Hagedom, Bank: Bullitt Could Have Avoided Theft, COURIER-JOURNAL, Aug.
27, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 16811648; see also Complaint at N 2, Bullitt
Cnty. Fiscal Court v. First Fed. Savings Bank of Elizabethtown, Inc. (Aug. 5,
2009), available at http://www.courier-journal.com/blogs/bullitt/ffsbcomplaint.pdf.
13 Complaint, supra note 12, at T 2.
14 See id. For more on how a Zeus Trojan Horse attack on a bank account
works, see Elinor Mills, Zeus Trojan Steals $1 Million from UK. Bank
Accounts, CNET NEWS (Aug. 20, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20
013246-245.html.
15 See, e.g., Krebs, supra note 3.
16 See id.
1 In this and similar scams, U.S. law enforcement usually apprehends some or
most of the U.S.-based intermediaries, or mules. See, e.g., Krebs, supra note 3.
18 For more on this, see Susan W. Brenner, Cybercrime Metrics: Old Wine,
New Bottles?, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH 13, 18-19 (2004).
19 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 2.
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within various U.S. states or other nation-states.20 Officers from
the jurisdiction in which the victim was attacked therefore must
conduct an investigation that differs from the parochial
investigations with which police historically have dealt.21
In traditional investigations, officers focus on a physical crime
scene because in the real world it is impossible to rob, assault,
murder, rape, or otherwise victimize someone without being in
physical proximity to them. This means the perpetrator is likely to
leave physical evidence at the scene of the crime and to have been
observed arriving at or leaving the crime scene.22 Given the need
for physical proximity between perpetrator and victim and the
constraints involved in fleeing the crime scene and disposing of
evidence or the proceeds of the crime, traditional investigations are
almost always conducted within a specific jurisdiction, i.e., within
a single nation-state or within a constituent state in a federal
system.2 3 That, in turn, means that the investigation will almost
certainly be conducted pursuant to the law of a single jurisdiction.24
As the Bullitt County bank theft illustrates, and as is explained
elsewhere, this is not true of cybercrime.25 Physical proximity
between perpetrator and victim is not required; the crime scene and
the evidence it encompasses can, as in the Bullitt County case, be
scattered across two or more nation-states, which means the
investigation will implicate the laws and the law enforcement
officers of more than one jurisdiction.26
This creates scenarios with which law enforcement officers are
ill-equipped to deal." As scholars have explained elsewhere, the
methods that law enforcement has traditionally used, on the rare
20 For more on this, see Susan W. Brenner, "At Light Speed": Attribution and
Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
379,416-81 (2007).
21 For more on this, see Brenner, supra note 2.
22 See id
23 See id
24 See id
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id.
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occasions when transnational evidence gathering was necessary,
are far too complicated and cumbersome to be effective in this
context. 28  And in some instances, they may simply not be
available; one country may not, for example, have a mutual legal
assistance treaty with another.29  This leaves the investigating
officers with two equally unattractive options: end their
investigation or possibly violate foreign law in their efforts to
obtain evidence.30
This is precisely what happened in 1999, when the Federal
Bureau of Investigation was investigating a series of intrusions that
originated in Russia and targeted "the computer systems of
businesses in the United States."' The attackers stole financial
information from the victims' computers and tried to extort money
by threatening to expose sensitive data to the public or damage the
victims' computers.32
After one of the attackers identified himself as "Alexey
Ivanov" and the FBI confirmed that he was in Russia, the
Department of Justice sent a request through diplomatic channels
to Russian authorities, asking them to detain Ivanov and question
him about the attacks. The Russians did not respond to the initial
contact or to a repeated request.34 Because the United States does
28 See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Joseph J. Schwerha IV, Transnational
Evidence Gathering and Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime, 20 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 347 (2002).
29 See id. at 354. A "mutual legal assistance legal treaty," or MLAT, is a
"bilateral intergovernmental agreement that obliges foreign jurisdiction
authorities to render assistance" in evidence gathering. Nicholas M. Mclean,
Note, Cross-National Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 121 YALE L.J. 1970, 1987
(2012).
30 See, e.g., Brenner & Schwerha, supra note 28 at 348-54.
3' United States v. Gorshkov, No. 00-550, 2001 WL 1024026, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. May 23, 2001).
32 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Russian Computer Hacker
Convicted by Jury (Oct. 10, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminalU
cybercrime/press-releases/2001/gorshkovconvict.htm.
See Ariana Eunjung Cha, A Tempting Offer for Russian Pair, WASH. POST
(May 19, 2003), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A7774-2003May
18?language=printer.
34 See id.
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not have an extradition treaty with Russia, Russian authorities
would not have been obliged to turn Ivanov over to the United
States for prosecution had the United States made such a request."
Because the U.S. agents had no authority to arrest Ivanov in
Russia, they decided to use a "sting" to get him to the United
States.36 They lured both Ivanov and his partner in cybercrime,
Vasiliy Gorshkov, to Seattle to interview with a phony company,
"Invita."" The men arrived in Seattle in November 2000 and were
met by an undercover agent, who took them to the "Invita" office."
There, agents posing as "Invita" employees asked the Russians to
demonstrate their hacking skills, using Invita computers. The
hackers did not know the FBI had installed loggers-programs that
record what is typed on a keyboard-on the computers.39 As
Ivanov and Gorshkov demonstrated their skills, the loggers
recorded what they typed, which included the usernames and
passwords they used to access the tech.net.ru server-which was
their kontora's (i.e., their unofficial company's) server in Russia.40
The server stored tools they needed for the hacking demonstration.
After the demonstration was over, they were arrested. 4 1
Without getting a search warrant, FBI agents retrieved the
usernames and passwords the loggers recorded and used them to
access the tech.net.ru server and download 250 gigabytes of data. 42
The agents did not let Russian authorities know what they were
doing.43 Gorshkov and Ivanov were subsequently indicted for
3 See id.; see also James A. Wilson, Extradition: The New Sword or the
Mouse that Roared?, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2011, at 1, 4 (citing list of
treaties in 18 U.S. Code § 3181).
36 See Cha, supra note 33.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See Brendan I. Koerner, From Russia with LOPHT, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May-
June 2002, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/printerfriendly.msp?id=286.
41 See Cha, supra note 33.
42 See Koerner, supra note 40.
43 See, e.g., United States v. Gorshkov, No. 00-550, 2001 WL 1024026, at *3
(W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001) (noting that the "search was done by FBI fiat").
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violating federal cybercrime law, and prosecutors prepared to use
evidence from the tech.net.ru server at their trials."
Gorshkov moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was
the product of a search that violated the Fourth Amendment
because the agents did not obtain a warrant before accessing the
Russian server.45 The district court held that the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not apply.46  The
Supreme Court has made clear that the "Fourth Amendment does
not apply to . . . search[es] and seizur[es] of a non-resident alien's
property outside ... the United States." 47 Gorshkov and Ivanov
were non-resident aliens; and the judge found that the search of the
Russian server took place entirely "in" Russia, not in the United
States.4
Ivanov pled guilty to various cybercrime charges and Gorshkov
went to trial and was convicted on similar charges, after which
both were sentenced to prison. 49  That was the end of the
prosecutions, but not the case: In 2002, Russia's Federal Security
Service-a police agency-charged one of the Invita agents with
hacking in violation of Russian law."o The charge was apparently a
symbolic way to assert Russian sovereignty over persons and
" See id at *1; see also United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368-
70 (D. Conn. 2001).
45 See Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026 at *1-2.
46 See id. at *2-3.
47 See id at *3 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990)).
48 See id at *3.
49 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Russian Computer Hacker
Sentenced to Three Years in Prison (Oct. 4, 2002), available at http://www.justi
ce.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2002/gorshkovSent.htm; Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Russian Hacker Sentenced to Prison (July 25,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/iv0725 r.htm.
so See, e.g., Mike Brunker, FBI Agent Charged with Hacking, MSNBC (Aug.
15, 2002), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078784/. Article 272 of the Russian
Criminal Code makes "illegal accessing of computer information" a crime.
UGOLOVNYU KODEKS RossllsKoI FEDERATH [UK RF] [CRIMINAL CODE] art.
272 (Russ.).
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things in the territory Russia controls." In announcing the charge,
a spokesperson explained that "[i]f the Russian hackers are
sentenced on the basis of information obtained by the Americans
through hacking, that will imply the future ability of U.S. secret
services to use illegal methods in the collection of information in
Russia and other countries."2 The Federal Security Service sent
the criminal complaint to the Department of Justice and asked that
the agent be surrendered for prosecution in Russia; the United
States has apparently never responded."
Scholars have examined the likely law enforcement response to
this evolving state of affairs: remote computer searches.54 The
analysis has focused on whether U.S. law enforcement's using
Trojan Horse programs to remotely search U.S. citizens'
computers would violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
"unreasonable" searches and seizures." At least one author has
concluded that it would not, as long as the officers conducted the
searches in a manner that comported with the Fourth Amendment's
requirements, i.e., as long as they either obtained a search warrant
that authorized the remote investigation or relied on a valid
exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigent
circumstances.5 If that assessment is correct, it means that U.S.
officers can remotely-and surreptitiously-explore the contents
of citizens' computers and then use whatever they find as evidence
in a criminal prosecution even though the search dynamic involved
s1 See, e.g., FSB Hopes to Bring to Court Case Against FBI Agents, Russ. &
FSU NEWS BULL., Oct. 10, 2001, available at 2002 WLNR 14527663 (noting
that "[t]he problem is a matter of principle").
52 See Brunker, supra note 50.
s3 See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Despite U.S. Efforts, Web Crimes Thrive,
WASH. POST (May 20, 2003), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/Al2
984-2003Mayl9; see also FSB Hopes to Bring to Court Case Against FBI
Agents, supra note 51.
54 Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches
and The Use of Virtual Force, 81 Miss. L. J. 1229 (2012). For a definition of
remote computer searches, see infra Part II.B.
5 See Brenner, supra note 54, at 1229-46.
56 See id at 1246-53.
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differs wildly from the searches with which the drafters of the
Fourth Amendment were concerned. "
That remote computer searches differ greatly from the type of
searches the Framers had in mind should not, in and of itself, be a
barrier to bringing remote computer searches within the compass
of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the United States' experience
with evolving communications technology and the Fourth
Amendment demonstrates that this outcome is preferable to the
alternative. For example, in 1928, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected Roy Olmstead's argument that officers violated the Fourth
Amendment by tapping phone lines leading into his home and
listening to conversations he had with his colleagues in crime."
The Court found that "[t]here was no searching" because "[t]here
was no entry" into Olmstead's home." In reaching this conclusion,
it relied on the proposition that "[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed a ... search .. . when it
was adopted."60
It was not until 1967 that the Court reversed itself and held that
it is a Fourth Amendment search for officers surreptitiously to
listen to or record citizens' telephone conversations.61 In the
intervening years, because wiretapping did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, those who were the targets of such activity could not
successfully move to have the evidence suppressed as the product
of a Constitutional violation. 62  Given the empirical analogies
between wiretapping and remotely searching a computer, it is
likely that the Court will hold that the latter also constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search.
Therefore, this Article assumes that, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, remote computer searches will be treated like more
traditional searches. This means the default rule in the United
" See id.
58 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
59 See id. at 464.
6o Id. at 465 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1924)).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
62 See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding that
use of a "detectaphone" listening device did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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States will be that such searches are lawful, as noted above, as long
as they are conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment's
requirements. Analogous rules are likely to emerge elsewhere.
The default rule may not be the only one that emerges in this
context.
Part II examines the possibility that dissonances will emerge in
the rules that govern remote computer searches in the United
States. It articulates a scenario in which dissonance emerges
between federal law and the law of certain states due to the fact
that the latter imposed standards on remote computer searches that
exceed those required by the Fourth Amendment in either of two
ways. Part II continues by analyzing the legal issues that are likely
to arise if and when this scenario eventuates. That is, it analyzes
how courts would deal with situations in which, for example,
officers from State A, which applies a "mere" Fourth Amendment
standard, remotely search a computer located in State B, which
applies a Fourth Amendment "plus" standard. The analysis
focuses on various issues, including the issue of precisely "where"
such a search should be deemed to be conducted, for the purposes
of applying search and seizure law.
Part III then examines the possibility that similar dissonances
will emerge in transnational searches. It notes that one level of
dissonance already exists in the search and seizure laws of two
European states (e.g., the United Kingdom and Germany), and
analyzes the likelihood that the issues examined in Part II are also
likely to manifest themselves at the international level.
The purpose of the generally theoretical analyses in Parts II and
III is to illustrate how remote crime and remote computer searches
challenge the territorially-based Westphalian governance structures
that currently monopolize sovereign power around the globe. A
subsidiary purpose is to illustrate the increasing untenability of this
system, at least with regard to transnational cybercrime.
II. UNITED STATES: FEDERALISM AND DISSONANCE
The potential for dissonant rules governing remote searches by
U.S. law enforcement arises from the nature of the U.S. federal
system:
52 [VOL. 14: 43
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America's federal system offers dual protection . . . under the federal
and state constitutions. The Federal Constitution protects all citizens,
and its protections must be enforced by the states. However, a state can
offer greater protection to its citizens based on that state's constitution.
A state court's interpretation of its constitution is not reviewable by the
United States Supreme Court. 63
Every U.S. state has its own constitution and "each of these
constitutions includes . . . a 'cognate' or 'analog' to the Federal
Fourth Amendment."' In the 1970's, some state supreme courts
began to interpret their versions of the Fourth Amendment as
providing more protection for privacy than the U.S. Constitution.6 5
Over the ensuing decades, these states have increasingly departed
from "the federal courts' narrow interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment"6 6 to provide "more expansive protection of privacy""
under their own constitutions, a trend one author suggests will only
increase "with advances in technology."68 The results are that (i)
every search and seizure conducted in the United States or
conducted by U.S. law enforcement officers and that targets a U.S.
citizen must comply with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment; and (ii) searches and seizures conducted in discrete
63 Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the
Land of 10,000 Lakes: Minnesota's Approach to Protecting Individual Rights
Under Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REV.
865, 870 (2007); see also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (noting
that states have the "power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures
than required by the Federal Constitution if [they] choose to do so").
64 Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the
Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information
from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 373, 374 (2006).
65 See, e.g., Katharine Goodloe, A Study in Unaccountability: Judicial
Elections and Dependent State Constitutional Interpretations, 35 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 749, 751, 753-55 (2011) (tracing the rise of the "New
Federalism movement," in which criminal defense attorneys began asking "state
judges to find more protections under state constitutions than the United States
Supreme Court found in similar provisions of the federal constitution").
6 Brian Andrew Suslak, Note, GPS Tracking, Police Intrusion, and the
Diverging Paths of State and Federal Judiciaries, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 193,
194 (2011).
67 Id.
6 8 Id. at 195.
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states must comply with the Fourth Amendment and with any
heightened requirements imposed by that state's law. 9
With regard to remote computer searches, this Article assumes
for the purposes of analysis"0 that (i) the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that such searches are constitutional if they are conducted in
accordance with the Fourth Amendment's requirements, (ii) twelve
U.S. state supreme courts have held that such searches are lawful if
they are conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment and
with the heightened requirements imposed by their state analogs of
the Fourth Amendment," and (iii) sixteen other state supreme
courts have held that remote computer searches are categorically
unlawful under their state analogs of the Fourth Amendment.72
The remaining twenty-two state supreme courts follow the U.S.
Supreme Court's rule and apply the Fourth Amendment only to the
conduct of remote computer searches.73 Since U.S. state supreme
courts cannot interpret their constitutions as providing less
protection than the Fourth Amendment,7 4 this exhausts the
scenarios that can arise in this context.
69 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 283 n.7 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rule, accepted by every Court of Appeals to
have considered the question, that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches
conducted by the United States Government against United States citizens
abroad."); see also U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1974).
70 The first two assumed categories-"Fourth Amendment-plus states" and
"Fourth Amendment-trump states"-do not actually exist, because no state has
so far adopted specific standards governing remote computer searches that
exceed the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, all of the U.S.
states are, by default, Fourth Amendment-only states. See infra note 73 and
accompanying text. That is, absent future legislative or judicial action, the law
governing remote computer searches in the fifty states is limited to the Fourth
Amendment.
7' These states shall be referred to as "Fourth Amendment-plus" states.
72 These states shall be referred to as "Fourth Amendment-trump" states.
7 These states shall be referred to as "Fourth Amendment-only" states.
Because the requirements imposed by these states are coterminous with those of
the Fourth Amendment, they will not be separately considered in the analysis
that follows.
74 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Constitution and laws made pursuant to it are
the "supreme Law of the Land" and state court judges are bound by it, the
"Constitution or Laws ... of [their State] to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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Part II.A reviews how the state courts that impose Fourth
Amendment-plus standards deal with situations in which
"outsiders"-federal agents and officers from another state-
conduct searches that do not comport with the heightened
requirements imposed by that state's supreme court. Part II.B then
analyzes how the existing standards apply or do not apply to
remote computer searches conducted pursuant to the standards in
effect in the Fourth Amendment-plus and Fourth Amendment-
trump states.
A. Current U.S. Law
The postulated existence of Fourth Amendment-plus and
Fourth Amendment-trump states illustrates how dissonant rules
could arise to complicate the application of the hypothesized rule
concerning the Fourth Amendment's applicability to remote
computer searches. The possibilities for and consequences of such
dissonance are examined below. The discussion also considers the
extent to which dissonance can become an issue in the residual
scenario noted above, in which twenty-two states follow the
federal rule and rely solely on the Fourth Amendment." In the
federal system and in these twenty-two states, the lawfulness of
remote computer searches is a function of the extent to which they
comport with the Fourth Amendment only.76 This is true
regardless of whether the searches are conducted by local law
enforcement officers, federal agents, or officers from other states.
This proposition would prevent the remaining states from refusing to enforce the
Fourth Amendment or enforcing a "Fourth Amendment light" standard by
enforcing some, but not all, of the Fourth Amendment's requirements or by
substituting a less-rigorous state rule. See, e.g., Ruth A. Moyer, Why and How a
Lower Federal Court's Decision That a Search or Seizure Violated the Fourth
Amendment Should Be Binding in a State Prosecution: Using "Good Sense"
and Suppressing Unnecessary Formalism, 36 VT. L. REv. 165, 178 (2011).
7 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.5(c), at
176 (4th ed. 2004) ("[T]here is no constitutional requirement that evidence
obtained in another jurisdiction be suppressed merely because the process of
acquisition offended some local law. . . .").
55FALL 2012]1
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Because the Fourth Amendment is a de minimis standard with
which all U.S. law enforcement officers must comply," rule
dissonance should not become an issue in prosecutions brought in
these states." If officers from another state or federal agents use
remote searches to obtain evidence from a computer in a Fourth
Amendment-only state, but do not comply with the Fourth
Amendment's requirements in doing so, the defendant(s) can, aside
from anything else, have the evidence suppressed as having been
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment."
In the twelve states in which the state supreme court has held
that remote computer searches are lawful if they satisfy a Fourth
Amendment-plus standard, the states' own officers are bound to
comply with that standard. If they conduct remote computer
searches that satisfy only the Fourth Amendment's requirements,
the evidence will be suppressed as having been obtained in
violation of the state constitution."o The same may be true if
federal agents conduct remote searches in a Fourth Amendment-
plus state but comply only with the Fourth Amendment. Some
courts have held that to be admissible in a prosecution in their
state, evidence must have been obtained in a manner that comports
with the requirements of their state constitution.' Other courts
7 See supra text accompanying note 74.
78 In Part II.B, the possibility is explored that dissonance might arise when
officers from a scenario (ii) or (iii) state remotely search a computer located in a
Fourth-Amendment-only state and then seek to use the evidence so obtained in a
prosecution brought in the scenario (ii) or (iii) state.
7 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
so See, e.g., State v. Mollica, 524 A.2d 1303, 1305-06 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987), appeal granted and cause remanded, 554 A.2d 1315 (N.J. 1989).
8 Accord State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1021 (Haw. 2011) ("We next
consider whether the searches of Petitioner's vehicle were valid under the
Hawaii Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that they were lawful under the
United States Constitution."); see, e.g., State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225,
232 (N.M. 2001); State v. Rodriguez, 854 P.2d 399, 404 (Or. 1993).
Courts that take this view tend to focus on the exclusionary rule's role in
protecting the citizen's right to be free from "unreasonable" searches. See, e.g.,
State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (N.M. 1993); People v. Porter, 742 P.2d
922, 925 (Colo. 1987). This is the preferred approach among modem courts.
See, e.g., State v. Torres, 262 P.3d at 1014-16; see also LAFAVE, supra note 76
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have held that "evidence seized by federal agents, acting ... in
conformity with federal standards, will be admissible in state
courts, even though the actions of the federal agents may not have
met a higher burden imposed by the state constitution. "82
Finally, some have applied this same principle to evidence
seized by officers from another state on the theory that the
(noting that there is a "general practice .. of using the exclusionary rule for
violations of state law").
The Hawaii Supreme Court found that the exclusionary rule serves three
principles: "judicial integrity, protection of individual privacy, and deterrence
of illegal police misconduct." Torres, 262 P.3d at 1018 (citing State v. Bridges,
925 P.2d 357, 365 (1996)); see also LAFAVE, supra note 76 ("The purposes for
using the exclusionary rule for violations of state law . .. are . . . deterrence of
the police; the imperative of judicial integrity; and assuring the people that the
government will not profit from its lawless behavior."). The Torres court found
the fact that evidence was obtained "in another jurisdiction" in violation of the
state's constitutional rules on search and seizure should be given "substantial
weight" in determining if use of the evidence would compromise the judicial
integrity of the state's courts. Torres, 262 P.3d at 1019. It also found the
question of whether the defendant's privacy rights were violated by such a
search should not "be governed by the law and constitution" of a jurisdiction
that guarantees citizens less privacy than Hawaii law. Id. at 1020. It
additionally found that excluding evidence seized by Hawaii officers in another
state would deter the state's officers from engaging in such conduct in the
future. Id.
82 Pena v. State, 61 S.W.3d 745, 754 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); see also State v.
Johnson, 879 P.2d 984, 988 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) ("[E]vidence that is lawfully
obtained by federal officers pursuant to federal law is admissible in proceedings
in courts of this state even if the Washington State Constitution would have
required exclusion of evidence obtained in a similar manner by state officials.").
Courts that take this view tend to focus on the deterrence rationale for the
exclusionary rule and often find that suppressing the evidence would serve no
purpose with regard to deterring conduct by their state officers because "it is
only the conduct of another jurisdiction's officials that is involved." Mollica,
A.2d at 1328. But see Torres, 262 P.3d at 1020 (finding that applying state
exclusionary rule "would deter any federal and state cooperation 'to evade state
law' "). This is known as the "reverse silver platter doctrine." See, e.g., id at
1014. One article suggests "more states will want to exclude such evidence now
that the Supreme Court has continued to narrow the exclusionary rule . . . ."
Robert M. Bloom & Hillary Massey, Accounting for Federalism in State Courts:
Exclusion of Evidence Obtained Lawfully By Federal Agents, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 381, 391 (2008).
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"protections afforded by the constitution of a sovereign entity
control the actions only of the agents of that sovereign entity.""
The states that apply their constitutions to only in-state law
enforcement officers incorporate a qualifier into this principle: In
searching for and seizing evidence, federal agents and law
enforcement officers from another state must not have been acting
in cooperation with officers from the state in which the search and
seizure occurred.84 The premise is that the state's heightened
standards do not apply to either when they act on their own behalf
because they are "officers from another jurisdiction" who are not
bound by local law," but that they do apply when federal agents or
officers from another state act "as agents for the [local] police."86
When such an agency relationship exists, the federal agents or
officers from another state "are subject to the same constitutional
standards applied to the [local] police," which means "evidence
83 Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1324. The Mollica court explained:
[B]ecause the constitution of a state has inherent jurisdictional limitations
and can provide broader protections than found in the United States
Constitution or the constitutions of other states, the application of the state
constitution to the officers of another jurisdiction would disserve the
principles of federalism and comity, without properly advancing legitimate
state interests.
Id. at 1327. The courts in at least one state refer to this as the "silver platter
doctrine." See, e.g., State v. Ventress, No. 59369-2-1, 2011 WL 1237644, at *2
(Wash. App. Apr. 4, 2011). The Supreme Court held that "a search is a search
by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if
evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a
silver platter." Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949). The Court
abolished this doctrine as unconstitutional, holding that "evidence obtained by
state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have
violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible ... in a federal criminal trial."
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
84 See, e.g., State v. Garcia-Navarro, 226 P.3d 407, 409 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010);
People v. Coleman, 439, 882 N.E.2d 1025, 1032 (Ill. 2008); Pena, 61 S.W.3d at
754-55.
85 Pena, 61 S.W.3d at 754.
86 Id. at 755.
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seized by [them] while operating in such capacity is subject to
exclusion if not seized according to those standards.""
The same principles should apply to the Fourth Amendment-
trump states, i.e., states in which the state supreme court has
declared that certain searches which do not violate the Fourth
Amendment are categorically unlawful under the state's own
constitution. It would be illogical for states to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of a Fourth Amendment-plus standard but
decline to suppress evidence obtained in violation of a Fourth
Amendment-trump standard. Logically, a violation of the more
stringent standard should trigger consequences that are at least as
severe as those imposed for a violation of the lesser standard.
There are, so far, no instances in which a state supreme court
has used its constitution to adopt a Fourth Amendment-trump
standard, even though such a result does not appear to be
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment." The Fourth
87 Id. Courts and commentators have found that a state supreme court's
interpretation of its own constitution as providing more protection than the
Fourth Amendment has "no binding effect on federal law enforcement." State v.
Schwartz, 689 N.W.2d 430, 445 (S.D. 2004). See also United States v. Clyburn,
24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment, not ... state law,
governs the admissibility of evidence obtained by state officers but ultimately
used in a federal prosecution."); United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1434
(6th Cir. 1994) ("A state may impose a rule for searches and seizures that is
more restrictive than the Fourth Amendment . .. . However, the state rule does
not have to be applied in federal court."); United States v. Dudek, 530 F.2d 684,
689-90 (6th Cir. 1976) ("[E]vidence seized in actual or (as here possible)
violation of state law may nonetheless be admitted in a federal prosecution
where the violation concerned would not be such as to require suppression of
evidence under federal constitutional law . . . ."). In other words, a federal court
is not bound to suppress evidence obtained in violation of state law. See, e.g.,
id. at 689-90; see also Kenneth J. Melilli, Exclusion of Evidence in Federal
Prosecutions on the Basis of State Law, 22 GA. L. REv. 667, 668 (1988)
("[F]ederal courts have generally resisted excluding evidence from criminal
prosecutions for violations of state law.").
88 But see Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 485 N.W.2d 135, 138-39 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) ("[W]e believe compelling reason exists to interpret the Michigan
Constitution as affording greater rights than those found in the federal
constitution.... Such a substantial departure, if appropriate, should be effected
by our Supreme Court, not by this Court."); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d
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Amendment-trump standard means the state supreme court used
the state constitution to hold that (i) state officers are categorically
barred from conducting certain types of searches even though the
searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment, but (ii) this
prohibition does not apply to federal agents, at least not when they
are acting solely as federal agents." The same principle should
also apply to officers from other states, as long as they were not
acting as agents of the local police.90
This Article addresses the so-far-hypothetical Fourth
Amendment-trump standard in this analysis because it is a
doctrinal and empirical possibility and because its hypothesized
application promotes the analysis of how dissonant rules can
complicate the process of conducting remote computer searches.
Part II.B examines this issue in greater detail.
B. Remote Searches and Dissonance
Before this Article considers how dissonant rules can
complicate remote computer searches, it is useful to define such
673, 675 (S.D. 1976) ("[T]he protection afforded by S.D. CONST., art. VI, § 11
warrant a higher standard of protection for the individual in this instance than
the United States Supreme Court found necessary under the Fourth
Amendment."). This may change as intrusive technologies increase in
sophistication and/or the exclusionary rule plays a lesser role in the enforcement
of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Bloom & Massey, supra note 82, at 391.
As noted above, the states-and their courts-are constitutionally bound to
enforce the Fourth Amendment, which is part of the "supreme Law of the
Land." See supra text accompanying note 74. This means that the states cannot
provide less protection for privacy than the Fourth Amendment requires, but, as
noted earlier, it does not bar states from providing more protection. See
Goodloe, supra note 65. Because a rule that categorically bars in-state officers
from conducting certain types of searches presumably provides at least as much
protection as the Fourth Amendment, Fourth Amendment-trump rules should
pass constitutional muster.
8 See, e.g., State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225, 232 (N.M. 2001) ("Our
application of state constitutional standards to determine the admissibility in
state court of evidence seized by federal agents will not affect any prosecution
that might be brought against Defendant in federal court, or otherwise
circumscribe federal activities within our borders.").
90 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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searches. Literally, a remote computer search would involve law
enforcement officers situated at Point A using the Internet to
surreptitiously search the data on a computer located at Point B. In
its simplest formulation, a remote computer search is one in which
the searchers are in a physical location other than the location
where the computer that is the target of their search is situated. In
this formulation, the only requirement for a "remote" computer
search is that the searchers and computer(s) being searched are not
physically proximate when the search occurs.
This baseline formulation of a remote computer search
implicates the Fourth Amendment as long as one assumes, as this
Article does, that U.S. citizens and aliens in U.S. territory have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their hard drives.9 1 The
default rule postulated in Part I would therefore require officers
who intend to conduct such a search to obtain a warrant or
otherwise satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
before they begin searching.92 And as outlined in Part II.A, the
officers might also have to comply with additional standards
established by state supreme courts. But that should be the only
complication they would confront with the baseline formulation
because it does not necessarily implicate the problem of
dissonance. Dissonance can arise only when Point A is in one
sovereign state and Point B is in another.93 Dissonance is an
91 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cormier, No. 09-1365, 2011 WL 3450643, at
*4 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 2011); Brackens v. State, 312 S.W.3d 831, 841
(Tex. Ct. App. 2009). Such an expectation of privacy does not exist if the hard
drive's owner has knowingly exposed its contents to public view by installing
and using file-sharing software that exposes at least some of its contents to other
users. See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (10th Cir.
2008); United States v. Gabel, No. 10-60168, 2010 WL 3927697, at *5-7 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 16, 2010). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."). The Supreme Court
has held that the Fourth Amendment applies to U.S. citizens and aliens who are
in U.S-controlled territory. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259,268-72 (1990).
92 See Brenner, supra note 54, at 1229-46.
93 See supra Part II.A.
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implicit possibility in the baseline formulation of remote computer
searches, but it is not inevitable.
To ensure dissonance can arise, the Article from this point
forward uses a modified formulation of remote computer searches:
The Article will assume that Point A, the place from which officers
conduct a remote computer search, is in the territory of one
sovereign state and that Point B, the place where the computer that
is the target of the search is situated, is in the territory of another
sovereign state. For these purposes, a "sovereign state" is a nation-
state (e.g., Canada),9 4 a sovereign entity that is a constituent of a
federal nation-state (e.g., Virginia),95 or a confederation of nation-
states (e.g., the European Union).96 The remainder of this Part only
addresses dissonance in the constituent entities that comprise the
United States: the fifty states plus the District of Columbia."
Part III examines dissonance among nation-states.
94 See, e.g., D. Carolina N(mez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law:
Undocumented Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 85,
117 n.158 (2011) (describing a nation-state as "a unitary, self-contained actor
with complete and exclusive jurisdiction over the people within its territory").
95 See, e.g., John Dinan, Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalism in Federal
Countries, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 837, 839 (2008) (noting that federal states whose
constituent states have their own constitutions include the United States,
Argentina, German Federal Republic, Mexico, and Venezuela); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
96 See, e.g., Elisabetta Lanza, Development, Core of State Sovereignty and
Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon-Urteil, 11 GERMAN
L.J. 399, 405 (2010) (noting that the European Union is a "confederation of
states" rather than a "federal state").
9 See, e.g., Jo Anne Hagen, An Overview of U.S. Import/Export
Regulations-Part I, Exports, COLO. LAW., July 2003, at 75, 75 (noting that the
United States "is comprised of the fifty states ... all U.S. territories,
dependencies, and possessions"). Dissonance among rules adopted by the
United States and its constituent entities can also encompass the U.S.-controlled
territories. See generally Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American
Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 797, 805-13
(2005) (reviewing applicability of U.S. law to territories and "other places
subject to U.S. sovereignty"). They are not incorporated into the analysis
because the application of the Fourth Amendment and other principles of U.S.
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Part II postulated three scenarios. The original scenarios and
the analysis in Part ILA implicitly incorporated the baseline
formulation of remote computer searches noted above, which
encompasses but is not coextensive with the possibility of rule
dissonance." The analysis of the scenarios in this Part addresses
that limitation of the original formulation by incorporating the
modified formulation outlined above; i.e., it assumes the searchers
and the target of the search are located in different states. This
does not guarantee rule dissonance but it guarantees that rule
dissonance is possible. The two Parts below analyze the
possibilities for dissonance in searches that involve states with
inconsistent standards. It is assumed, in analyzing all of these
scenarios, that the law enforcement officers who conducted the
remote computer search complied with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.99
C. State-to-State Dissonance
This Part examines the dissonance that arises when officers
from one state remotely search a computer in another state and
then use the evidence obtained from that search to prosecute
someone in their state. The scenarios fall into two categories:
searches that involve Fourth Amendment-only and Fourth
Amendment-plus states, and searches that involve Fourth
Amendment-plus and Fourth Amendment-trump states.'"
1. Fourth Amendment-only and Fourth Amendment-plus States
If officers in one Fourth Amendment-only state remotely
search a computer in another of these states, no dissonance arises
because these states all use the same, federal standard: Remote
searches are constitutional if they are conducted in accordance
with the Fourth Amendment.'"' This result holds regardless of
law is not as linear as it is for the U.S. states and the District of Columbia. See,
e.g., Ediberto Romdn, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557,
586-88 (2006).
98 See supra Part II.A.
99 See supra Part II.
100 See supra Part II.
"ot See supra Part II.
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whether the prosecution is brought in the state whose officers
conducted the cross-border search or in one of the other Fourth
Amendment-only states. In other words, the person who is the
target of such a search, and a resulting prosecution, cannot move to
suppress the evidence obtained in the remote search either on the
grounds that it violated the Fourth Amendment or the law of either
of the states involved. It also holds regardless of whether the local
officers, officers from another Fourth Amendment-only state, or
federal agents conduct the search.'0 2 Because these states apply the
(for the Article's purposes) de minimis Fourth Amendment
standard,o3 dissonance does not arise with regard either to the other
twenty-one states that follow this rule or with regard to the federal
system. This is true regardless of whether the evidence is to be
used in a prosecution brought by the state in which the computer
was searched, by another Fourth Amendment-only state, or by the
federal system.
It is not true for prosecutions brought in a Fourth Amendment-
plus state that are based at least in part on evidence obtained by
remotely searching a computer in a Fourth Amendment-only state.
Assume, for example, that Fourth Amendment-plus Ohio's officers
remotely search a computer in Fourth Amendment-only Idaho.'04
The officers provide the evidence so obtained to an Ohio
prosecutor who seeks to admit it into evidence in the Ohio
prosecution of John Doe, an Ohio resident who downloaded child
pornography from the computer in Idaho. In conducting the
remote computer search, the Ohio officers complied with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment and, in so doing, complied
with the requirements of the Idaho Constitution.' But they did
not comply with the Ohio Constitution's additional requirements.
102 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
'0 The law attributed to Ohio in this and the subsequent scenarios in this
section is purely hypothetical.
105 Given the default rule hypothesized earlier, i.e., that remote searches are
constitutional if they are conducted in accordance with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, this Article will assume in the scenarios examined from this
point forward that the officers who conducted the out-of-state search had a local
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Assume John Doe moves to suppress the evidence the officers
obtained by searching the State W computer on the grounds that
the search violated the Ohio Constitution. Doe points out that he is
an Ohio citizen and is therefore entitled to the protections of its
constitution. Under Ohio law, if officers from that state conduct a
search for evidence without complying with the Fourth
Amendment and with the added requirements imposed by its
constitution, the evidence must be suppressed.10
search warrant that authorized the search. See supra Part II. That is, the Article
will assume the officers got a warrant that satisfied the Fourth Amendment
before they conducted the remote search.
Because their actions were authorized by a judicially-issued search warrant,
one might argue that the forum state, i.e., the state in which the prosecution in
which the use of the extraterritorially-seized evidence is at issue, must honor the
warrant, even though it was issued by a court in another state, under the Full
Faith and Credit clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1
(stating that each state must give full faith and credit to the "Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State"). The theory is that a search warrant
is the product of a "judicial proceeding" and therefore triggers the applicability
of the clause. See, e.g., John Bernard Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict
ofLaws, 73 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1227-28 (1985).
While it is not clear whether a search warrant qualifies for enforcement under
this theory, there is another objection to relying on the clause as the basis for
enforcing out of state search warrants. The Supreme Court has held that "the
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that sister States enforce a foreign
penal judgment." Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970).
The issue in Nelson was whether the clause obligated the California courts to
honor a North Carolina detainer for a prisoner who was serving a sentence for a
conviction in a California court. See id. at 225-27. Given the principle noted
above, the Court held that California was "free to consider what effect, if any, it
will give to" the North Carolina detainer. See id. at 229. The Nelson Court was
applying what is known as the penal exception to the Full Faith and Credit
clause. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 267 P.3d
48, 50-53 (Nev. 2011). Because the exception has been relied on in state courts,
the Article will assume that it applies in this context and nullifies the
applicability of the Full Faith and Credit clause.
106 If the computer the officers searched belongs to someone other than Doe,
the Ohio prosecutor may be able to defeat Doe's motion to suppress by arguing
that the officers' conduct did not result in a "search" either for Fourth
Amendment purposes or for the purposes of applying the Ohio Constitution. If
the computer belongs to someone else, Doe almost certainly would not have a
Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in it, and it should be assumed, for
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This issue has not yet arisen. If and when it does, it is likely
that the State X prosecutor will argue that, because the officers did
not conduct the search "in" State X, they were not bound to
comply with the requirements of the Ohio Constitution."' If the
the purposes of analysis, that the same principle applies in Ohio constitutional
analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134-35 (10th
Cir. 2002); State v. M.A., 954 A.2d 503, 512 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
Nor would Doe have a reasonable expectation of privacy if he owned the
computer but had installed file-sharing software on it that let others download
child pornography from it. See, e.g., United States v. Norman, 448 F. App'x.
895, 897 (1Ith Cir. 2011) (finding no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy
in computer shared with others); United States v. Ladeau, No. 09-40021-FDS,
2010 WL 1427523, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2010) (finding no Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy in computer shared with others).
For the purposes of analysis, it is assumed that the Idaho computer which the
Ohio officers searched belonged solely to Doe, that it was a computer he used
for business he transacted in Idaho, and that he was able to access it remotely
from his home in Ohio. Those assumptions should suffice to establish the
expectation of privacy required to trigger the protections of the Fourth
Amendment and the higher protections imposed by Ohio's constitution.
107 This argument raises questions about precisely where the search occurred.
This argument assumes that the Ohio officers were in Ohio when they searched
the computer in Idaho. See supra Part II.B (discussing the modified formulation
of remote computer searches). Did the search therefore occur (i) "in" Ohio
because that is where the target of the search was located, (ii) "in" Idaho
because that is where the searchers were located, or (iii) in both? This issue
does not arise with traditional, non-remote searches because the searchers and
the target(s) of the search are necessarily physically proximate while the search
takes place. With cyberspace, the search dynamic can be altered, so physical
proximity is no longer inevitable.
This issue has yet to be resolved in the context of remote computer searches,
but courts that confront it might apply the rule federal courts have applied to
transborder wiretaps, i.e., that a communication is "intercepted" where the
tapped phone is located and where the "listening post" is located. See, e.g.,
United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 403-04 (5th Cir. 1996). If that
proposition is applied to the Doe scenario, the "place" where the search occurred
will not be dispositive because it occurred in State W and in State X.
There is another possible argument as to why Ohio need not-and perhaps
cannot-apply its law to the search of the computer in Idaho: "The allocation of
authority among the states is territorial." Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of
Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice ofLaw,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 316 (1992). The U.S. Constitution creates one federal
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computer the Ohio officers searched in Idaho belonged to an Idaho
citizen, that argument might prevail because the heightened
requirements of Ohio's constitution are presumably intended to
protect Ohio citizens (only) and the defendant would not be an
Ohio citizen."o0
sovereign and fifty subordinate but fully viable state sovereigns. See, e.g., id. at
315.
Those who drafted the Constitution believed that for sovereigns to be able to
share territory, i.e., with a federal system the authority of which essentially
assumed that of the states, the allocation of state and federal authority had to be
"defined as carefully as could be, so that the respective powers of each
sovereign were workably clear." Id. Part of defining the respective spheres of
authority of the states was establishing clearly defined territorial boundaries for
each, boundaries that defined the state's territory and, in so doing, defined the
legitimate sphere within which it could make and enforce laws. See, e.g., id. at
316-17 (citing U.S. CONsT amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1).
Perhaps the most important constitutional provision designed to ensure that the
states respect each other's laws is the Full Faith and Credit clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. IV § 1; see also supra note 105.
This brings us back to the Doe case: The Ohio prosecutor could argue that,
under the above principles, he cannot apply Ohio law to a search that occurred
on the territory of State W because one state does not have the ability to apply
its search and seizure law to activity that takes place within the territory of
another. See, e.g., State v. Bridges, 925 P.2d 357, 367-69 (Haw. 1996),
overruled by State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1021 (Haw. 2011); cf State v.
Davis, 834 P.2d 1008, 1012-13 (Or. 1992).
In other words, the Ohio prosecutor would argue that Ohio would be
unconstitutionally usurping the sovereign authority of Idaho by applying its
search and seizure law to remote computer searches that target computers in the
territory of Idaho. See, e.g., Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and
Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a Response, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 870
(1991) ("If the prosecuting state were to impose its constitutional restrictions
upon police .. . operating outside the boundaries of that state, would that give its
constitution extraterritorial effect?"); see also Alan Howard, Fundamental
Rights Versus Fundamental Wrongs: What Does the U.S. Constitution Say
About State Regulation of Out-Of-State Abortions?, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 797,
811 n.31 (2007) ("[T]he proposition that a state may not project its laws into
other states . . . is bedrock in our federal system . . . .").
108 See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 217 P.3d 1032, 1046 (N.M. 2009) ("[I]t is
imperative that our state constitution ... protect the rights of our citizens .... ).
This scenario is a variation of the situation noted earlier in which courts have
found that a state's heightened privacy guarantees must be applied when its
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If the computer belongs to Doe,'09 he can argue that Ohio law
should apply here because he is an Ohio citizen who is entitled to
the heightened protections of its constitution, even with regard to
out-of-state activity by Ohio officers who gathered evidence that
would be used to prosecute him in Ohio."o Doe can argue that
applying Ohio's constitutional requirements to the out-of-state
activity by Ohio officers at issue here is consistent with the state
supreme court's intention to put added constraints on the
investigative tactics used by Ohio officers when they investigate
citizen is the target of a search that did not provide equivalent protection. See
supra note 81 and accompanying text. And as discussed earlier, courts also
often consider deterrence in determining whether to apply heightened
guarantees; Doe is a not an Ohio citizen, so the Ohio court might not be inclined
to apply its heightened privacy guarantees to him in order to deter its officers
from violating that aspect of Ohio law. See supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
In other words, Ohio has an interest in deterring its officers from violating its
law when they are investigating Ohio citizens in Ohio, but has little, if any,
interest in deterring them from violating its law when they conduct searches
outside its territory that do not target its citizens. Ohio might apply its
heightened privacy requirements to Doe in order to ensure the integrity of its
judicial processes (assuming an Ohio court would find that the conduct of out of
state searches that do not target Ohio citizens threatens to undermine such
integrity). See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 106. This and other scenarios involving the search of a
computer in one state that is "owned" by someone who resides in and is a citizen
of another state, assume a cloud computing scenario, i.e., that Doe, in the
scenario outlined above, owns storage space on a cloud computing system that is
physically situated in another state.
It is further assumed that ownership of that space provides a Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy in it, as well as the privacy level(s) needed
to trigger heightened state search and seizure laws. See, e.g., Derek Constantine,
Note and Comment, Cloud Computing: The Next Great Technological
Innovation, the Death of Online Privacy, or Both?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 499,
509 (2012) (noting that despite a "lack of clarity" in this area, "several recent
decisions apply the Fourth Amendment to various networked ... situations,
showing courts' willingness to provide Fourth Amendment protection to
cloud computing environments").
110 The argument as formulated above implicitly assumes that the search
occurred only in Idaho. The argument would be strengthened if the court found
that it occurred both in Idaho and in Ohio.
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Ohio citizens."' Doe can also argue that if the court does not apply
Ohio's constitutional requirements to out-of-state investigative
activity of Ohio officers, it would undermine the deterrence
rationale inherent in those requirements and thereby weaken the
state's exclusionary rule."12 If, as noted above, the computer does
not belong to Doe, it will be much more difficult for him to make
these arguments successfully."'
Similar issues would arise if Richard Roe, an Idaho citizen,
were prosecuted in Idaho based on evidence Idaho officers
obtained by remotely searching a computer in Ohio. Assume that
the Ohio computer belonged to Roe." In conducting the search,
the officers complied with the Fourth Amendment, which is all
Idaho's constitution requires. But they did not comply with the
heightened requirements the Ohio Constitution imposes on such
searches. Roe moves to suppress the evidence as having been
obtained in Ohio by methods that violate the Ohio Constitution.
This scenario is essentially the converse of the Doe scenario: Doe,
an Ohio citizen, was being prosecuted by Ohio authorities based on
evidence Ohio officers searched for and seized from a computer in
Idaho. In so doing, they complied only with Idaho's constitutional
requirements, which provide less protection than those of Ohio's
constitution. Doe's argument is arguably stronger than Roe's
because Doe was being prosecuted in Ohio by Ohio authorities
based in part on evidence they presumably obtained by violating
Ohio's constitutional law. The only dissonant component of the
prosecution was that the Ohio officers obtained the evidence by
conducting an out-of-state search that violated the laws of their
(and Doe's) state, but that complied with the law of the state in
which the search took place and with the Fourth Amendment.
Roe, on the other hand, is an Idaho citizen who is being
prosecuted by Idaho authorities based in part on evidence Idaho
officers obtained by remotely searching a computer in Ohio. Their
search of the Ohio computer complied with the Fourth Amendment
.. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
113 See supra note 106; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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and therefore with the constitutional standards of Roe's own state,
but it did not comply with the heightened requirements of Ohio's
constitution. As such, it is difficult to see how Roe can
successfully argue that the search violated his rights under the U.S.
Constitution, Idaho's constitution, or Ohio's constitution."
Because the search of the computer complied with the Fourth
Amendment and State W's constitutional requirements, Roe has no
basis on which to suppress under the federal or Idaho constitutions.
That leaves Ohio. Roe, of course, is not being prosecuted by Ohio,
which means he would not be moving to suppress the use of the
evidence in an Ohio court on the grounds that it had been obtained
in violation of Ohio law. How, then, could an Ohio court apply its
law to the search of the Ohio computer owned by Roe is so
inclined?
The first step in analyzing this question is to examine the
interests state courts consider in deciding whether to apply their
heightened privacy guarantees to particular police conduct."'
Because Roe is a not an Ohio citizen,"' and because the search at
issue was not conducted by Ohio officers, an Ohio court would
presumably not apply the state's heightened privacy guarantees
here, given the minimal potential effect that would have in
deterring its officers from violating the Ohio Constitution.'" And
" See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. To establish that Roe had
a federal, Idaho, or Ohio constitutional right to privacy in the searched Ohio
computer, this Article will assume he owns it. See supra note 106.
116 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
117 Because Roe is not a citizen, and because the search at issue did not target
him, personally, while he was "in" Ohio, it is difficult to see how he was
"deprived" of the enhanced rights the Ohio Constitution confers on its citizens
and others who are the targets of searches conducted in Ohio's territory. This,
of course, assumes that the heightened protections of Ohio's constitution, and
those of other Fourth Amendment-plus states, are only intended to apply (i) to
their own citizens and/or (ii) to searches conducted "in" their states.
'18 States like Ohio (in this hypothetical) might have an interest in using civil
or criminal liability to deter their officers from conducting or assisting in the
conduct of searches that violate state law if they extend the heightened privacy
guarantees their state constitution establishes to citizens of other states, as well
as their own. As to why states might do this, some might essentially treat the
greater privacy their state offers as a commodity to entice out-of-staters to store
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because Ohio is not prosecuting Roe, applying the heightened
requirements of its law to him would not promote the integrity of
its judicial processes."l9
But there might be circumstances that would prompt a Fourth
Amendment-plus court to apply the state's heightened privacy
guarantees to a version of this scenario. If the original scenario is
modified so that Ohio officers assisted the Idaho officers who
searched Roe's Ohio computer, Ohio might have an interest in
seeing that its more rigorous law was applied so as to deter its
officers from providing similar assistance in the future. If,
alternatively, the scenario is modified so the Ohio computer is
owned by an Ohio citizen who lets Roe use it, this would give
Ohio more of a stake in the conduct at issue. 2 0 Ohio courts would
presumably be more inclined to apply the state's heightened
privacy guarantees if Ohio (or other Fourth Amendment-only state)
officers, with the assistance of Ohio officers, searched a computer
that was owned by an Ohio citizen and located in Ohio but (only)
complied with the lesser requirements of Idaho law (and the Fourth
Amendment).'"' Even though the prosecution in this hypothetical
was brought in Idaho, an Ohio court might find that Ohio's
interests in deterring its officers from engaging in activity that
data in and otherwise make use of the more security systems hosted in Ohio.
See generally Daniel M. Laifer, Note, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision
of International Banking, Post-BCCI, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. S467, S482 (1992)
(noting that some countries used bank secrecy laws "to attract business").
If Ohio were to do this, it would probably want to ensure that its own officers
were prohibited from engaging in conduct that subverted the availability of
those guarantees to non-citizens, as well as citizens. See generally Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the Swiss Confederation and
the United States, U.S.-Switz., art. 3(l)(a), May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019
(noting that Swiss authorities can refuse to assist officers from another country
with a criminal investigation if doing so would "prejudice its sovereignty,
security or similar essential interests"); see also James A. Kehoe, Recent
Development, Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of U.S.
Insider Trading Laws Internationally, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 345, 364 (1995).
1'9 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
120 It could also undermine Roe's claim to have had a cognizable private
interest in the computer. See supra note 106.
121 See supra Part II.B.
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violated Ohio's law warranted applying Ohio law in this
situation.122
These variations return to the question posed earlier: Because
Roe is not being prosecuted in Ohio and therefore cannot file a
motion to suppress in that state, how could one of Ohio's courts
apply Ohio law to the conduct at issue? If Ohio law allowed
individuals like Roe to file civil suits seeking redress for violations
of Ohio law, and if Roe filed such a suit, an Ohio court would then
be in a position to apply Ohio law to the variation of the original
hypothetical in which Ohio officers assist with the search of Roe's
Ohio computer.'2 3 The same should be true if Ohio made it a crime
for its officers to violate Ohio constitutional law and if the officers
involved in the search of Roe's computer were prosecuted under
this law.124
Both options implicitly assume that some or all of the Fourth
Amendment-plus states would be willing to extend the protections
of their more rigorous law to non-citizens like Roe. This is not
inconceivable: Fourth Amendment-plus states might find it is in
their interest to extend their heightened privacy guarantees to
citizens of other states, as well as their own, at least under certain
circumstances. As to why they might do this, some or all of these
states might essentially treat the greater privacy their law offers as
a commodity to entice out-of-staters to store data in and otherwise
make use of the higher security systems hosted on cloud
computing systems located in their state.'25
122 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128, 131, 134-37 (Mont. 2002).
See generally Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688, 693 (Conn. 1998) (creating cause
of action for damages resulting from violation of search and seizure provisions
of state constitution).
124 See generally Commonwealth v. Stephens, 515 N.E.2d 606, 608-09 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1987) (establishing that it is a crime to violate guarantees of state
constitution); see also supra note 81.
125 In other words, they would offer a digital version of bank secrecy. See
generally Laifer, supra note 118 (noting that some countries used bank secrecy
laws "to attract business").
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States that adopted this approach would probably want to
ensure that their law enforcement officers were effectively deterred
from engaging in conduct that subverted the availability of this
commoditized privacy to non-citizens, as well as citizens. 126 The
civil or criminal liability postulated above would presumably be
the only way they could do this, unless the state was prosecuting a
non-citizen victim of such conduct, and their courts were in a
position to grant a motion to suppress evidence obtained in
violation of their Fourth Amendment-plus requirements.
The imposition of civil or criminal liability on officers by a
Fourth Amendment-plus state like Ohio would promote the
deterrence interests noted above, but it would not directly impact
the out-of-state prosecution of a non-citizen like Roe, who is at
least arguably the "victim" of the officers' malfeasance. In other
words, the imposition of such liability would sanction the
misconduct but would not give Roe any basis for having the fruits
of that misconduct suppressed in his pending Idaho prosecution.
Roe might be able to use the imposition of civil or criminal
liability on the Ohio officers who participated in the search of the
Ohio computer to gain some advantage in the prosecution Idaho
has brought against him. Because the imposition of either type of
liability would be predicated on a finding that the Ohio officers
violated Ohio's search and seizure law, he could try to use that
finding in a motion challenging the use of the evidence in his own
state.
Roe might be able use the Ohio conviction or civil verdict to
establish that the conduct of the officers violated Ohio law, and
thereby preclude litigation of that issue in the Idaho prosecution. 127
126 See Kehoe, supra note 118. See generally Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters Between the Swiss Confederation and the United States, supra
note 118, at art. 3(1)(a) (establishing that Swiss authorities can refuse to assist
officers from another country with a criminal investigation if doing so would
"prejudice its sovereignty, security or similar essential interests").
127 This strategy can apply between civil and criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,
People v. Trakhtenberg, No. 290336, 2011 WL 1902020, at *9 (Mich. Ct. App.
May 19, 2011) ("Crossover estoppels, which involves the preclusion of an issue
in a civil proceeding after a criminal proceeding and vice versa, is permissible."
(quoting Barrow v. Pritchard, 597 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Mich. Ct. App.1999))).
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But even if Roe were to succeed in doing this, there is certainly no
guarantee, and perhaps no reason even to believe that the Idaho
court would find the illegality of the Ohio officers' conduct a
reason to grant Roe's motion to suppress evidence obtained by
searching the Ohio computer.
2. Fourth Amendment-plus and Fourth Amendment-trump States:
Routine Dissonance
The basic dynamic of rule dissonance should be the same for
conflicts between Fourth Amendment-plus states and Fourth
Amendment-trump states as it is for conflicts between Fourth
Amendment-only states and Fourth Amendment-plus states.'28 The
issue in both contexts is determining what, if any, significance a
state's more rigorous search and seizure law has for evidence-
gathering in and prosecution by a state with a lesser standard.
The primary difference between the scenarios examined in
Part II.C.1 and those that involve conflicts between "plus" and
"trump" states is that the standards involved in the latter all exceed
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The conflicts between
"plus" and "trump" states give rise to two types of dissonance:
routine rule dissonance and a special case. This Part examines
routine rule dissonance, while Part II.C.3 examines special case
dissonance.
Because the Fourth Amendment's requirements are a constant
in any analysis of search and seizure under U.S. law, they were
implicitly subsumed into the analysis in Part II.C.I. That is,
Fourth Amendment requirements were not a problematic element
in the scenarios examined above; the problematic element was the
See generally 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1218 (2012) ("In the context of a criminal
case, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue decided, or necessarily
determined, in the defendant's favor by a valid and final judgment.").
Assuming, as seems reasonable, that Idaho was not a party to the Ohio civil
and/or criminal proceedings, Roe apparently could not use judgment in either of
those cases or the findings of fact or conclusions of law issued as part of the
judgment as collateral estoppel in the Idaho prosecution. See, e.g., Stephens,
885 N.E.2d at 793-94. But see State v. Gonzalez, 380 A.2d 1128, 1131-32
(N.J. 1977).
128 See supra Part II.C. 1.
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disconnect between the search and seizure laws of a state that
follows the Fourth Amendment only and a state that adds
additional requirements for searches and seizures that are
conducted in its state (and, perhaps, involve its citizens).129
Therefore, insofar as the analysis of the hypotheticals in
Part II.C. 1 involved a conflict between "higher" and "lower" state
standards, one should be able to extrapolate the results to conflicts
between Fourth Amendment-plus states and Fourth Amendment-
trump states. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that a
Fourth Amendment-plus standard is necessarily a less-demanding
standard than a Fourth Amendment-trump standard. The latter,
after all, categorically prohibits remote computer searches, while
the former allows them as long as they comply with requirements
that are somehow more rigorous than those imposed by the Fourth
Amendment.
Part II.C.1 began the analysis by noting that no dissonance
would arise when officers from one Fourth Amendment-only state
conduct a remote search that targets a computer in another Fourth
Amendment-only state because the states follow the same
standard.'3 0 This could, but probably would not, be true of the
Fourth Amendment-plus states: If the supreme courts of these
states all adopted the same heightened requirements for the
conduct of remote computer searches, then no dissonance would
arise when officers from one of the twelve Fourth Amendment-
plus states conducted a remote computer search in another of the
states."'
If and when states adopt Fourth Amendment-plus standards
that govern remote computer searches and other intrusions, it is
likely that the standards will be idiosyncratic and provide varying
degrees of protection. Therefore, to the extent that the standard of
129 See supra Part II.C.1; see also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
130 See supra Part II.C.1.
131 State-to-federal dissonance would arise if a remote computer search was
conducted "in" a Fourth Amendment-plus state by federal agents who (only)
complied with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Judges in the state
would presumably apply the analysis outlined in Part II.A to determine whether
the evidence could be used in the local court.
FALL 2012] 75
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
one Fourth Amendment-plus state provides more protection than
the standard adopted by other Fourth Amendment-plus states,
dissonance of the type examined in Part II.C.1 is likely to arise.
And because these scenarios, like the ones examined above,
involve a conflict between "higher" and "lower" standards, the
analysis in Part II.C.1 can be extrapolated to conflicts among
Fourth Amendment-plus states.
While the Part II.C.1 analysis should generally be adequate to
resolve dissonance between Fourth Amendment-plus and Fourth
Amendment-trump states, the latter's rather draconian standard
could give rise to an issue that does not arise in conflicts between
Fourth Amendment-only and Fourth Amendment-plus states.
While "only" and "plus" states both impose specific constitutional
requirements on the conduct of remote computer searches, they do
allow such searches to be conducted. That means the analysis
focuses on mismatched standards, rather than on a conflict between
a standard and an absolute prohibition. This difference could
create special dissonance issues.
3. Fourth Amendment-plus and Fourth Amendment-trump States:
A Special Case?
The conflict between a heightened standard and a prohibition
might not be problematic, either conceptually or as applied, if the
Fourth Amendment-trump states applied the prohibition to remote
computer searches that were conducted by their own law
enforcement officers, regardless of "where" the search occurred.132
The officers from such a state-like Florida-would then be bound
by their state's prohibition on remote computer searches regardless
of whether the searches were conducted "in" State Y's territory or
"in" the territory of another state.
This would limit, if not eliminate, the special dissonance that
would arise if officers from a Fourth Amendment-trump state
conducted a remote computer search of a computer in Fourth
Amendment-plus Ohio. While this scenario is to some extent
132 This, of course, is essentially the opposite of the approach the U.S.
Supreme Court has taken with regard to the Fourth Amendment. See supra note
58 and accompanying text.
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analogous to the conflicts examined in Part II.C.1, it differs in one
notable respect: Here, the Florida officers are not simply searching
a computer in another state without abiding by that state's more
demanding laws; they are doing something they are categorically
forbidden to do in their own state.
Why should that matter? How does that scenario differ from
the "greater" or "lesser" dissonance examined in Part II.C.1? In a
functional sense, and even in a conceptual sense, it probably does
not; it is, after all, a conflict between a "greater" (prohibitory) and
"lesser" ("only" or "plus") standard. Perhaps the differentiating
factor here is that this scenario carries a hint of taint, a suggestion
of hypocrisy. Florida has decided that remote computer searches
are such a massive intrusion on individual privacy that it refuses to
allow its officers to use them against its own citizens-but has no
qualms about using them against citizens of other states.
In the scenarios analyzed in Part II.C. 1, officers from an "only"
state could conduct no-dissonance remote computer searches in a
"plus" state if they complied with the latter's more rigorous search
and seizure requirements (as well as with the Fourth
Amendment)."' Also, officers from a "plus" state could conduct a
133 As to how they would go about doing this, assume the "only" state officers
would simply, on an ad hoc basis, do their best to implement the "plus" state's
heightened requirements. They presumably could not rely on a warrant issued
by one of their own state judicial officers, because state court judges and
magistrates can, at most, issue search warrants that are to be executed within the
territory of the state they serve. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-812 (2006); see also
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-805(c) (2005); IND. CODE § 35-33-5-7(a) (2011); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 542.286(1) (1974); Gattus v. State, 105 A.2d 661, 664 (Md. 1954)
("A search warrant cannot have extraterritorial effect.").
The "only" state officers might-if this were not unlawful-persuade one of
their state magistrates to issue a warrant that authorized a remote search for and
the seizure of evidence located in the "plus" state under conditions that would
satisfy its law, on the theory that this would provide at least some "symbolic"
legitimacy to the process. State judges and magistrates in most, if not all, states
have the authority to issue warrants that authorize a search for evidence of a
crime, the commission of which occurred partially in their state and partially in
one or more other states. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104(a) (2005); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-201(1) (1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-2-1 (1968); Wis.
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no-dissonance search in an "only" state if they complied with the
Fourth Amendment and with the more rigorous requirements their
state's law imposed on such searches. 3 4 It is therefore possible to
eliminate dissonance in conflicts between "only" and "plus" states.
The problem is that under existing law, officers are under no
obligation to eliminate dissonance.' 35 While the Supreme Court
has noted that "ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent
sovereigns," it has held that given the provisions of the Tenth
Amendment, relations among the states are "purely a matter of
comity."'3 6 In other words, like nation-states, U.S. states are
sovereign enough that they do not have to apply each other's
law.'13
STAT. § 939.03(1) (2003); see also Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86,
109-11 (1909).
134 As to why and how they might do this, see supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
135 In the scenarios above, neither group of officers is, arguably, required to
comply with the "plus" state's more rigorous requirements because (i) state law
only applies "in" a state's territory and (ii) it not clear where a remote search
computer search occurs. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text. In
the first scenario, then, the officers from the "only" state could argue that
because they were in their state when they searched the computer in the "plus"
state, the search occurred "in" their state, so they were only required to comply
with the Fourth Amendment. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
And in the second, the officers from the "plus" state could argue that because
the computer they searched was in an "only" state, the search occurred "in" that
state, which they were not required to comply with the more rigorous
requirements of their own state's law. See supra notes 107-108 and
accompanying text
136 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425 (1979); see U.S. CONST. amend. X
("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States . . . ."). As one source
notes, comity "is viewed not as a legal obligation but as a matter of
mutual respect among sovereigns to consider each other's interests." Anthony J.
Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1036
n. 69 (2011); see, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
In Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-22; see also Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as
Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 11, 17 (2010) (arguing that nation-states' law is "absolute" in their own
territory).
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The issues examined in Part II.C.1 and examined in this Part
therefore go to the extent to which U.S. states are willing to respect
the idiosyncratic laws of their counterparts, i.e., to comity. The
Supreme Court has "presumed that the States" intend "to adopt
policies of broad comity toward one another," but has made it clear
that such policies are not something it can impose.'38 The no-
dissonance searches hypothesized above that involve officers from
an "only" state and from a "plus" state are examples of comity.
The officers in these hypotheticals are under no legal obligation to
apply the other state's law but do so out of a sense of comity (and,
perhaps, to minimize objections to the use of the evidence they
obtain in these searches).'3 9
There does not appear to be a no-dissonance analog for Fourth
Amendment-trump states. In the scenarios examined above, the
officers from the "only" and "plus" states eliminated dissonance by
applying the "plus" state's higher standards, even though they were
at least arguably not required to do so.'40 It would be impossible
for them to replicate this strategy for searches conducted in a
"trump" state because the latter prohibits such searches.141
Applying the "trump" state's law would mean they could not
conduct the remote search, something their own states' laws allow.
Dissonance would therefore be unavoidable (i) if officers from
"only" and "plus" states remotely searched a computer in a
"trump" state and (ii) if officers from a "trump" state remotely
searched a computer in another state.14 2
If a "trump" state were to apply its prohibition on remote
computer searches to other states, as well as its own, it would
13 Hall, 440 U.S. at 425-26.
139 See supra Part II.C. 1.
140 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
141 See supra Part II; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
142 Dissonance would arise in the second scenario regardless of whether the
state in which the search was conducted was an "only" state, a "plus" state or
another "trump" state. As to the latter, if officers from one "trump" state
conducted a remote computer search in another "trump" state, the search would
violate the latter's prohibition on such searches.
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eliminate the second category of dissonance noted above.143 Its
officers would then not be able to do what they cannot do in their
own state, which would demonstrate that this "trump" state
"respect[ed] the sovereignty" of other states.'" The question is
whether that would be reciprocated. The "trump" state would be
surrendering its right to not apply its law outside the boundaries of
its own territory-something, as discussed in Part II.C. 1, states are
not inclined to do. If other states did not adopt a reciprocal rule
(i.e., did not agree to refrain from conducting remote computer
searches in the "trump" state) the first category of dissonance
would persist and would no doubt be a source of tension between
this "trump" state and most, if not all, of the other states.
III. TRANSNATIONAL SEARCHES POTENTIAL FOR
NATION-STATE DISSONANCE
As Part I explained, nation-state dissonance has occurred in at
least one rather notorious instance: the Invita incident, in which
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents remotely searched a
computer server that was in Russia and that belonged to Russian
citizens.'4 5 The Parts below survey the current and future prospects
for remote computer searches in the United States and in Europe.
Part III.A examines the prospects for remote searches in the United
States and Part III.B examines the prospects for such searches in
Europe.
A. United States
The FBI's search of the Russian computer generated
controversy in the United States and elsewhere,'46 which may
143 As noted above, a "trump" state could accomplish this by simply applying
its law to remote computer searches conducted by its law enforcement officers,
regardless of "where" the search occurred. See supra note 107 and
accompanying text. This, as noted earlier, is essentially the opposite of the
approach the U.S. Supreme Court has taken to the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
'44 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425 (1979).
145 See supra Part 1.
146 See supra Part I; see, e.g., Robert Lemos, FBI "Hack" Raises Global
Security Concerns, CNET NEWS (May 1, 2001, 12:05 PM), http://news.cnet.com
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explain why U.S. law enforcement has not publicly pursued the use
of remote computer searches. The FBI possesses and has used a
remote data-gathering program for roughly the last decade.147
Initially known as Magic Lantern, the program was renamed the
Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier ("CIPAV").'4 8
The limited information that is available on the few known
occasions in which CIPAV has been used indicate that it "is [used]
only used after law enforcement officers have obtained a search
warrant."' 4 9 If that is true, it inferentially supports the proposition
noted above: Remotely accessing a computer and extracting data
from it is a "search" under the Fourth Amendment and must
therefore be conducted in accordance with Fourth Amendment
requirements. "5
It appears the FBI is planning to become more aggressive in
conducting remote computer searches. In May 2012, the FBI
announced it had created a new unit, the purpose of which is to
create new technologies that can more effectively intercept
communications and, apparently, conduct remote computer
searches.'' Because the new unit is named the Domestic
/2100-1001-25681 1.html; see also Nicolai Seitz, Transborder Search: A New
Perspective in Law Enforcement?, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 23, 33 (2004-05)
("[T]he permissibility of a transborder search . .. is currently the subject of
controversial discussion.").
147 See, e.g., Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption
and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 359, 400 (2010) (noting that the existence of Magic Lantern software was
revealed in 2001).
148 See id.; see also Nat Hentoff, The FBI's Magic Lantern, THE VILLAGE
VOICE (May 2, 2002), http://www.villagevoice.com/2002-05-28/news/the-fbi-s-
maic-lantern/1/.
' Soghoian, supra note 147 at 401; see also Benjamin Lawson, Note and
Comment, What Not to "Ware": As Congress Struggles against Spyware, the
FBIDevelops Its Own, 35 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 77, 88-93 (2008).
15o See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
'' See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, FBI Quietly Forms Secretive Net-
surveillance Unit, CNET NEWS (May 22, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8 3 0 1-100
9_3-57439734-83/fbi-quietly-forms-secretive-net-surveillance-unit/ (reporting
that the president of a technology company that has worked with the Department
of Justice said he "would expect that capabilities like CIPAV would be an
example example" of what the new unit will do).
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Communications Assistance Center, its involvement with remote
computer searches will presumably not involve transnational
searches. 5 2  If that is true, it also inferentially supports the
proposition that U.S. law enforcement assumes remote searches
must comply with the Fourth Amendment.'
The next Part examines the potential for dissonance to arise
between nation-states, if and when their law enforcement agencies
begin conducting transnational remote computer searches.
B. Europe
The following Parts will discuss the potential for dissonance
between European Union ("E.U.") 1' member states.
1. Presence ofRemote Search Programs in European Countries
In a press release issued at the end of 2008, the E.U. announced
a new five-year plan to target cybercrime.' 5 Among other things,
it called for law enforcement officers in E.U. states to conduct
"remote searches" of computers.'5 6 A few months earlier, the E.U.
Council Presidency had distributed a note regarding a
" '[c]omprehensive plan to combat cyber crime' to the
representatives of each E.U. state."' It noted that there were
152 See id.
153 See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
154 The European Union is a unique economic and political partnership
between 27 European countries that together cover much of the continent. Basic
Information on the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/index en.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
1 See Press Release, Europa, Fight Against Cyber Crime: Cyber Patrols and
Internet Investigation Teams to Reinforce the E.U. Strategy (Nov. 27, 2008),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/18
27.
156 See id.
15 TONY BUNYAN, STATEWATCH, STATEWATCH ANALYSIS: E.U. AGREES
RULES FOR REMOTE COMPUTER ACCESS BY POLICE FORCES-BUT FAILS, As
USUAL, TO MENTION-THE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 2 (2009),
available at http://www.statewatch.orglanalyses/no-83-remote-computer-access
.pdf. The Council of the European Union is the main decision-making body of
the European Union. See, e.g., Lesley Dingle & Bradley Miller, A Summary of
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"projects already in existence" that required "common
approaches," including "computer searches, which are a delicate
issue because of their cross-border nature."' As one source noted,
the reference to "projects already in existence" implied that
agencies in at least some E.U. states were already conducting
cross-border remote computer searches in their home countries and
across borders in other states.'5 9
The note became the basis of a proposal for formal Council
Conclusions that initially called for "measures to facilitate remote
computer searches," which would allow "investigators rapid access
to data.""' The final version of the Conclusions called for
"facilitating remote searches if provided for under national law,
enabling investigation teams to have rapid access to information,
with the agreement of the host country."''
Neither the initial press release nor the subsequent news stories
explained what, precisely, these "remote searches" would involve,
but there was a practical precedent for using such tactics. In 2006,
a German attorney general sought a warrant from "the
investigating judge of the federal court" that would authorize
German police "to search a suspect's computer using an RFS
[remote forensic tool]." 6 2 The application for the warrant sought
Recent Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, 33 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO.
71, 94 (2005).
158 BUNYAN, supra note 157.
I59 Id.
160 Id. (quoting COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, DRAFT COUNCIL
CONCLUSIONS ON A CONCERTED WORK STRATEGY AND PRACTICAL MEASURES
AGAINST CYBERCRIME, E.U. DOC. No. 13567/08 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/stl 3/stl3567.enO8.pdf).
161 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, DRAFT COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON A
CONCERTED WORK STRATEGY AND PRACTICAL MEASURES AGAINST
CYBERCRIME, E.U. Doc. No. 15569/08 at 5 (Nov. 11, 2008), available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/stl5/stl5569.enO8.pdf.
162 See, e.g., Wiebke Abel & Burkhard Schafer, The German "Federal
Trojan "-Challenges between Law and Technology, TEUTAS LAW & TECH.
(Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.teutas.it/societa-informazione/prova-elettronica/634-
the-german-federal-trojan-challenges; see also German Police Seeks Legal
Permission for Online House Search, SPAMFIGHTER (Mar. 14, 2007),
http://www.spamfighter.com/News-7906-German-Police-Seeks-Legal-Permissio
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permission to install the tool on the computer. Once installed, the
tool would copy all data stored on the computer and then transfer it
to the investigating authority for evaluation.16 3
When the judge declined to issue the warrant, the attorney
general appealed to the federal court (the Bundesgerichtshof),
which held that the warrant could not be issued because "no legal
authorisation existed ... under German law permitting the use of
RFS tools .. . by law enforcement agencies."'" Around the same
time, another German state adopted legislation that authorized the
use of remote computer searches (or remote forensic tools).'65 A
complaint challenging the constitutionality of this legislation was
filed with the German Federal Constitutional Court (the
Bundesverfassungsgericht).' 66 On February 27, 2008, the Federal
Constitutional Court held that it violated the German Constitution
and was consequently unlawful and unenforceable.'6 7
n-for-Online-House-Search.htm.
163 Abel & Schafer, The German "Federal Trojan ", supra note 162.
165 Id.; see also German Police Seeks Legal Permission for Online House
Search, supra note 162.
166 See Abel & Schafer, The German "Federal Trojan ", supra note 162.
167 See id. The authors explain:
The decision [of the German Federal Constitutional Court] was based on a
"new" human right in the confidentiality and integrity of information
technology systems, for the first time recognised explicitly by this court.
The court ... derived this right from the fundamental rights in personal
dignity and personality rights under articles 2 I in connection with 1 I of the
Constitution (Grundgesetz - GG). This right can only be restricted, and
therefore the use of [remote] investigation tools by law enforcement
agencies is only permissible, when significant higher-ranking fundamental
values, such as the life and integrity of others, or liberty or common goods
essential for human existence, are in danger. While this in principle leaves
open the use of [such tools] to prevent an imminent terrorist attack, it could
not be used to retrospectively investigate one, nor for general prevention of
acts of terrorism in the absence of a specific, imminent and clearly
identified threat . ...
Id.
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The remote forensic tools at issue in these cases apparently
involved the use of Trojan Horse programs.168 Trojan Horse
programs seem to be at least one of the tools officers in Britain,
another E.U. country, can use to carry out "intrusive surveillance"
of certain suspects.' The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
of 2000 ("RIPA") allows certain officials to authorize such
surveillance.' An official cannot authorize intrusive surveillance
unless he or she determines that it is necessary for any or all of the
following reasons: (i) it is "in the interests of national security";
(ii) to prevent or detect "serious crime"; or (iii) it is "in the
interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom." 7 1
Intrusive surveillance can be authorized even if it "includes
conduct outside the United Kingdom."l 72 According to the code of
practice for conducting such surveillance, "[w]here action in
another country is contemplated, the laws of the relevant country
must also be considered." 73
The RIPA defines intrusive surveillance as surveillance that is
"carried out in relation to anything taking place on any residential
premises" and "involves the presence of an individual on the
premises . . . or is carried out by means of a surveillance device."174
See id. (noting that either computer viruses or Trojan Horse programs
could be used, but tend to emphasize the use of Trojan Horse programs). For
more on the impact of the Federal Constitutional Court's ruling, see infra
Part III.C.
169 See, e.g., Flora Graham, Police "Encouraged" to Hack More, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 5, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7812353.stm (reporting use of Trojan
Horse programs).
170 See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23 § 32(1) (Eng.)
(defining the officials who can authorize searches as Secretary of State and
senior authorizing officers). Intrusive surveillance is surveillance that concerns
"anything taking place on any residential premises" and involves the use of "an
individual on the premises" or "surveillance device." Id. § 26(3).
'17 Id. § 32(2) (referencing §32(3)).
172 Id. at § 27(3).
1 HOME OFFICE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, COVERT SURVEILLANCE AND
PROPERTY INTERFERENCE: REVISED CODE OF PRACTICE 10 (2010), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorismlripa-forms/code-o
f-practice-covert?view-Binary.
174 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act § 26(3).
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Surveillance that is carried out "by means of a surveillance device"
that is not "present on the premises" is not intrusive unless the
device "provides information of the same quality and detail as
might be expected to be obtained from a device actually present on
the premises." 75
In 2009, the BBC reported that the British Home Office
"signed up to an E.U. strategy . . . that 'encourages' police . . . to
remotely access personal computers" in order to combat
cybercrime."'7  This is presumably the strategy outlined above. 77
The story noted that British police already had the ability to
conduct such searches and were "carrying out a small number of
these operations" each year."' It also noted that a spokesperson for
the Home Office "said the E.U. agreement would not affect police
behaviour and was not legally binding." 7 9
It is unclear whether other members of the E.U. have also
incorporated remote computer searches into their criminal
procedure.'s Some clearly have not, but an absence of evidence
relating to such programs in other countries does not necessarily
mean they do not exist.'"' Despite the lack of clear evidence, it
seems likely that most E.U. countries have not been conducting
such searches, and in many instances still are not using remote
computer searches because the authority to conduct such searches
currently does not exist under their national law. 82
"' Id. at § 26(5).
176 Graham, supra note 169.
177 See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
178 Graham, supra note 169.
179 See id
1so But see infra Part III.C (discussing use of remote computer searches in one
country).
181 See, e.g., Juan Carlos Ortiz Pradillo, Fighting against Cybercrime in
Europe: The Admissibility of Remote Searches in Spain, 19 EURO J. OF CRIME,
CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 363, 377-81 (2011), available at
https://ruidera.uclm.es/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10578/1662/fi 1318575944-ORT
IZ%20PRADILLO%20the%20admissibility%20of%2Oremote%20searches%20i
n%20Spain%202011 .pdf?sequence=1.
182 See supra note 161 and accompanying text; see infra Part III.C.
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2. Potential for Dissonance in European Countries
Notwithstanding the lack of data and present inability of other
European countries to conduct remote computer searches, the
potential for nation-to-nation rule dissonance with regard to the
conduct of searches clearly exists as to the two countries examined
above. As was shown, United Kingdom law allows British officers
to conduct remote computer searches for any of the three purposes
noted above.'" German law does not allow such searches to be
conducted to investigate crimes that have already been
committed.'84 Because the Federal Constitutional Court derived
this prohibition from its recognition of a new constitutional "right
in the confidentiality and integrity of information technology
systems,"' it is inferentially reasonable to assume that the court
would apply the prohibition to law enforcement officers from other
countries as well. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that
under the Federal Constitutional Court's decision, Germany has in
effect become a "trump" state-a state that outlaws remote
investigative computer searches.'86
If that assumption is correct, then it would seem to follow that
if British officers conducted a remote computer search that
targeted a computer located in Germany, there would, in effect, be
dissonance between an "only" state and a "trump" state, with the
resulting complications analyzed above.' A different type of rule
183 See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
186 See supra Part II; see also supra note 167 and accompanying text. As
noted earlier, the Federal Constitutional Court's ruling bars German officers
from using remote computer searches to investigate crimes that have already
been committed and also bars their use otherwise except insofar as certain
"higher ranking fundamental values" are in peril. See supra note 167 and
accompanying text. So while Germany has not yet adopted a categorical
prohibition on the use of remote computer searches, it qualifies as a de facto
"trump" state because the court's ruling bars the use of remote computer
searches to investigate ex post criminal activity. See supra Part II.
187 See supra Parts II.C.1-2. Britain might better be characterized as a "plus"
state insofar as its requirements for the conduct of remote computer searches
exceed those for the conduct of routine investigative searches. See supra Part II;
see also supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text. If that characterization is
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dissonance between an "only" state and a "trump" state could arise
if the Federal Constitutional Court's ruling did not apply to
German officers, so they could conduct remote computer searches
targeting computers located in countries other than Germany. "'
That would presumably mean that German officers could conduct
such searches of computers in Britain without complying with
British law, which could also give rise to the other type of
dissonance, and resulting complications, analyzed earlier.'89
Given the number and diversity of nation-states in Europe, and
the extent to which their citizens interact online and offline, it
seems reasonable to believe that if and when European officers
begin using remote computer searches, they will generate a notable
quantum of rule dissonance.'9 0 Until recently, there was no reason
to believe that such a development was in the offing, but, as
Part III.C explains, that changed in spring 2012.
C. Recent Developments in Remote Transnational Computer
Searches
In fall 2011, the Chaos Computer Club, described as "a
German hacking organization,"'9 1 discovered that police from "at
least five German states"'9 2 were using Trojan Horse software to
accurate, then there would be dissonance between a "plus" state and a "trump"
state. See supra Parts II.C. 1-2.
188 Such an interpretation seems reasonable, given that the Federal
Constitutional Court's decision was based on the recognition of a new right
derived from the German Constitution. See supra notes 166-67 and
accompanying text.
189 See supra Parts II.C.1-2. Again, the dissonance might be better
characterized as a conflict between a "plus" state and a "trump" state.
190 The manifestation of that quantum of European-focused dissonance will
only be exacerbated if and when federal or state law enforcement agencies from
the United States begin to conduct remote computer searches that, at least on
occasion, target computers that are in Europe and belong to European citizens.
See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
191 See, e.g., Nicholas Kulish, Germans Condemn Police Use of Spyware,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/world/europe/u
proar-in-germany-on-police-use-of-surveillance-software.html.
192 John Leyden, German States Defend Use of "Federal Trojan ", THE
REGISTER (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/10/12/bundestroja
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conduct remote computer searches.'93 The software let police
remotely record "keystrokes, capture screenshots and activate
cameras and microphones."' 9 4 The software's use for investigative
purposes therefore "exceeded the powers prescribed to the police
by Germany's Federal Constitutional Court."'95 Officers in the five
German states admitted using it to "monitor suspects' e-mails and
phone calls over the Internet" and "captured tens of thousands of
screenshots in cases involving theft, fraud, and illegal
performance-enhancing drugs." 196
ner/. The five identified states were Baden-Wlrttemberg, Brandenburg,
Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria and Lower Saxony. Id The German Federal
police "denied using this specific Trojan." Id.; see also David Gordon Smith &
Kristen Allen, Electronic Surveillance Scandal Hits Germany, SPIEGEL ONLINE
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-
berlin-electronic-surveillance-scandal-hits-germany-a-790944.html ("Interior
Ministry denied that the software had been used by the Federal Criminal Police
Office (BKA), which is similar to the American FBI.").
An interesting aspect of the Trojan Horse software used by the German states
is that it "transmitted information via a server located in the US." Smith &
Allen, supra note 192. That raises the possibility that the analysis of "where" a
remote computer search could be a trichotomy, rather than a dichotomy. See
supra note 107.
193 See, e.g., Kulish, supra note 191.
194id
195 Id See also supra Part 1II.B; accord Smith & Allen, supra note 192.
196 Kulish, supra note 191. As to the origin of the Trojan Horse program(s)
used by the German states:
Documents . . . suggest that the German Customs Investigation Bureau
purchased surveillance services from German software developer DigiTask
valued at more than E2m. The same set of documents suggest that
DigiTask develop a commercial Trojan intended for law enforcement called
Skype Capture Unit.
Leyden, supra note 192; see also Daniel Schmitt, Skype and the Bavarian
Trojan in the Middle, WIKILEAKS (Jan. 24, 2008), http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Skyp
e and theBavarian trojanin themiddle. According to one source:
German federal law allows the use of malware to eavesdrop on Skype
conversations. But the [Chaos Computer Club] analysis suggests that the
specific Trojan it wrote about is capable of a far wider range of functions
than this-including establishing a backdoor on compromised machines
and keystroke logging. The backdoor creates a means for third parties to
hijack compromised machines, while the lack of encryption creates a
mechanism for miscreants to plant false evidence.
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These revelations brought "swift and strong" public
condemnation, along with demands for an inquiry into the matter
and legislation that would address the use of such tactics in
searching and surveilling computers. 97 Experts, who were asked
to comment on the German police's use of such tactics, said it
would be increasingly necessary for governments to determine the
extent to which they are willing to authorize remote computer
searches.'
Then, in April 2012, the German government revealed that
between 2008 and 2011, representatives from the FBI, the U.K.'s
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), and France's secret
service, the DCRI, were among those to have held meetings with
German federal police about deploying "monitoring software"
used to covertly infiltrate computers. 199
The information the government released also suggested that
German authorities were using other spyware in addition to the
Trojan Horse program discovered by the Chaos Computer Club:
German authorities had also acquired a license in early 2011 to test a
similar Trojan technology called 'FinSpy,' manufactured by England-
based firm Gamma Group. FinSpy enables clandestine access to a
targeted computer, and was reportedly used for five months by Hosni
Mubarak's Egyptian state security forces in 2010 to monitor personal
Skype accounts and record voice and video conversations over the
Internet.200
But what many found even more shocking was information a
German Member of Parliament obtained from Secretary of State
Ole Schroder:201
[The] German federal police force, the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), met
to discuss the use of monitoring software with counterparts from the
Leyden, supra note 192.
197 See Kulish, supra note 191.
198 Id
199 See Ryan Gallagher, U.S. and Other Western Nations Met with Germany
over Shady Computer-Surveillance Tactics, SLATE (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.sl
ate.com/blogs/future-tense/2012/04/03/bundestrojaner-finspy_u_s_officials-me
t with germanytodiscusscomputer surveillance .html.
200 Id.
201 id.
90 [VOL. 14: 43
Remote Computer Searches
U.S., Britain, Israel, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands,
Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Austria. The meetings took place
separately between Feb. 19, 2008, and Feb. 1, 2012 . ... Both the FBI
and Britain's SOCA are said to have discussed with the Germans the
'basic legal requirements' of using computer-monitoring software. The
meeting with SOCA also covered the 'technical and tactical aspects' of
deploying computer infiltration technology.. . . France's secret service
and police from Switzerland, Austria, Luxemburg, and Liechtenstein
were separately briefed by the BKA on its experiences using Trojan
computer infiltration. 202
Not surprisingly, no details have surfaced as to what was involved
in the U.S., German, and British officers' discussions of the "basic
legal requirements" involved in implementing remote computer
searches. But given the challenges cyberspace creates for law
enforcers, it is very likely that the officers focused on the issues
examined in this Article: the rule dissonance that can result from
transnational (or trans-state) computer searches and the
complications that dissonance can create for officers and
prosecutors. The goal was, almost certainly, to avoid the type of
international friction that resulted from the FBI agents' essentially
ad hoc action in the Invita case examined in Part I.
What is particularly interesting about this prolonged series of
meetings is the secrecy with which they were conducted. One
observer speculated that the accelerating use of cyberspace is
creating a "shift in police tactics . . . that appears . . . to be taking
place almost entirely behind closed doors and under cover of state
secrecy." 203
Unlike this author, some do not see the secrecy that apparently
surrounds the use of remote computer searches as necessarily
sinister.204 The clandestine nature of the meetings noted above and,
no doubt, other similar meetings is probably a function of
pragmatic considerations. Law enforcement officers from various
countries are grappling with the conflict that currently exists
between the need to deploy "computer intrusion techniques that
202 id.
203 Id.
204 See id (noting the need for "democratic scrutiny" of "highly intrusive
[computer] surveillance technologies").
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exist in a legal gray area" if they are to battle cybercrime
effectively and the need to preserve individual privacy.205
IV. CONCLUSION
The meetings described in the previous Part were likely an
attempt to address and resolve some of the issues examined above:
the likelihood that remote computer searches will be categorically
illegal in some U.S. states and nation-states, conditionally legal in
others, and generally legal in still others.206 It is likely that the
meetings were to a great extent dedicated to identifying the
dissonances that exist between the laws of the countries whose
representatives were involved and attempting to identify ways in
which avoid or minimize the impact the use of remote
transnational computer searches could have on investigations and
prosecutions. The need to avoid or minimize the presumptive or
potential illegality of such searches advances the interests of law
enforcement insofar as it addresses the issues noted above, i.e., the
prosecution's ability to use the evidence obtained as the result of a
remote transnational computer search. It also, at least to some
extent, can reduce the type of international tension that arose in the
Invita case, which was discussed in Part I.
Meetings such as these may be a modest first step toward
reducing the rule dissonance among nation-states that can arise
from remote transnational computer searches. Countries may, at
some point, be able to take the next step and directly address these
issues by adopting treaties that eliminate, or at least reduce the
dissonance, associated with remote computer searches. In the
interim, judges, lawyers, and law enforcement officers will
probably have to rely on ad hoc tactics to minimize dissonance and
its impact on particular cases and on relations among nation-states
and subordinate states in federal systems like the United States.
205 Id.; accord. Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Distributed Security:
Preventing Cybercrime, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 659, 663-69
(2005) (discussing the challenges cybercrime creates for law enforcement);
Brenner & Schwerha, supra note 28 at 347-54.
206 See supra Parts III.A-B; see also supra Part II.
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